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Abstract 
Regional resilience is a topic of growing academic and policymaker interest.  This paper 
empirically examines this concept by scrutinising the impact of Brexit on Scottish small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).  Given their crucial importance for the Scottish 
economy, SMEs are a good “unit of analysis” and a powerful barometer for measuring 
regional resilience.  The research adopted a novel mixed methods approach examining 
the Longitudinal Small Business Survey together with in-depth interviews with SMEs.  It 
is clear from the survey analysis that certain types of SMEs (i.e. innovators and exporters) 
were disproportionately fearful of Brexit. This was firmly corroborated by the interview 
data which found these same firms to be the most detrimentally impacted, manifesting in 
reductions in employment, exports and innovation.  In contrast, the majority of 
domestically focused, less innovative SMEs were much less concerned and less negatively 
affected. While a small minority managed to deploy adjustment mechanisms to mitigate 
these negative effects, overall many firms had major difficulties operationally and 
strategically coping with this uncertain and turbulent environment. The findings suggest 
proactive public policies will be needed to help mitigate the difficulties caused by Brexit 
for certain types of SMEs.   
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1. Introduction  
In the main, the academic debate on Brexit has strongly centered on the 
underlying sources of inequality (i.e. the so-called “left behind”) which generated the vote 
to leave the EU (Lee et al, 2018; Pollard, 2018; Billing et al, 2019; Bromley-Davenport et 
al, 2019).  By comparison, much less academic scrutiny has centred on the types of 
businesses most vulnerable to these form of unforeseen shocks. Prior evidence suggests 
that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are be disproportionately impacted by 
chronic uncertainty given their lower resilience to unexpected shocks (Monsson, 2017; 
Williams and Vorley, 2017), especially those located in peripheral regions (Gherhes et al, 
2018).  Yet, to date, how different types of regions and firms cope, adjust and adapt to 
unforeseen shocks such as Brexit and its related uncertainty has been largely under-
researched.  Therefore, following pleas for more “agency” and “firm-centred” approaches 
towards analyzing regional resilience (Dawley et al, 2010; Bristow and Healy, 2014; 
Soroka et al, 2019), this paper empirically scrutinizes the impact of Brexit on Scottish 
SMEs. 
Regional resilience is a topic of growing academic and policy maker interest 
(Bristow and Healy, 2014; Ray et al, 2017; Martin and Sunley, 2020), a term invoked by 
spatial scholars to describe how regions respond to shocks and disequilibrium (Hassink, 
2010; Bristow and Healy, 2014; Boschma, 2015).  Despite accusations of opacity and 
conceptual “fuzziness” (Pendall et al, 2010; Fröhlich and Hassink, 2018), regional 
resilience helps stimulate important new ways of thinking about changes to our economic 
landscape (Pike et al, 2010; Martin, 2018). Consequently, it has “become a fashionable 
lens for understanding the factors that shape and determine the nature of economic 
change and performance over time” (Williams and Vorley, 2018, p. 1).  Indeed, much of 
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the regional economic debate since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has 
focused on factors which explain the resilience or vulnerability of regions to sudden 
economic change (Bachtler and Begg, 2018).  Consequently, over the last decade the 
impact of “shocks” has recently become a prominent subject of empirical enquiry in 
economic geography and regional research (Martin and Gardiner, 2018).   
On the whole those examining resilience to Brexit at a firm-level have typically 
focused on how large firms (often foreign-owned) are likely to be affected by Brexit 
(Dhingra et al, 2018).  Such evidence provides valuable insights; but it fails to provide the 
necessary information to assess the likely impact of Brexit for SMEs, despite these firms 
being crucial for peripheral regional economies such as Scotland.  While many SMEs have 
limited resources and managerial capabilities they often have the ability to pivot quickly 
to adjust to rapid changes in the marketplace caused by unforeseen shocks (Morgan et al, 
2020). For others, this may not be the case however.  Indeed, some commentators have 
speculated that Brexit could have “dire consequences” for these small businesses 
(Cumming and Zahra, 2016; p. 690).  However, to date there has been a paucity of hard 
empirical evidence on the actual impact of Brexit at a sub-national level (Los et al, 2017; 
Brown et al, 2019).    
There are compelling arguments for examining Brexit-related resiliency within 
the Scottish context.  In March 2018 there were 343,535 SMEs operating in Scotland, 
accounting for 99.3% of all private sector businesses and 54.9% of private sector 
employment (Scottish Government, 2018).  Scotland is also highly dependent on EU 
sources of human capital and regional funding which disproportionately benefit Scottish 
SMEs (McCullough 2018)1.  Given their crucial importance for the Scottish economy, 
 
1 For example, a recent study by the Federation of Small Business found that more than a quarter of all 
small firms in Scotland employed EU workers (FSB Scotland, 2017).   
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SMEs are therefore a good “unit of analysis” and a powerful barometer for measuring 
regional resilience. Indeed, recent research examining the perceived impact of Brexit 
revealed that Scottish SMEs exhibited greater reservations about Brexit compared to 
their counterparts elsewhere in the UK (Brown et al, 2019).  
In addition to this conceptual focus on regional resilience, this paper also has 
strong implications for both UK and Scottish public policy more generally given the 
applicability of the resilience construct for policymakers (Healy and Bristow, 2020; 
Martin and Sunley, 2020).  As scholars have noted, institutions acutely matter for regional 
resilience, especially their role in mitigating “the impact of shocks” such as Brexit 
(Boschma, 2015, p. 744).  This is important because having significant devolved powers 
may potentially enable Scotland to mitigate some of the negative Brexit-related impacts 
on the economy via bespoke policy interventions.  Indeed, some scholars have noted how 
Scotland was one of the first parts of the UK to respond to the impact of Brexit with new 
support packages designed to assist SMEs (Brown et al, 2019).  This may also hold for 
Wales and Northern Ireland who have similar devolved powers.   
The paper investigates the impact of Brexit on Scottish SMEs by employing a novel 
mixed methods empirical research design (Molina-Azorín et al, 2012).  This dual 
approach enabled the research to examine ex ante the concerns immediately following 
the referendum and then explore the actual impacts arising from Brexit-related 
uncertainty.  In order to obtain an overview of how Brexit will impact Scottish SMEs, it 
draws upon the UK’s main small business survey.  To delve deeper into the current and 
likely future impact of Brexit, the research also involved in-depth interviews with a wide 
cross-section of Scottish SMEs (n = 21) to gauge the firm-levels effects emanating from 
the Brexit process.  This method provides a novel empirically grounded contribution to 
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literature on regional resilience by answering the following research question: what types 
of Scottish SMEs are most concerned by Brexit and how they are being impacted.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  First, we examine the 
literature on regional resilience uncertainty and how this could impact smaller firms.  
Second, we outline the methodology adopted.  Third, we examine the quantitative data to 
see the types of Scottish SMEs most likely to be affected by Brexit.  Fourth, we outline the 
results of the qualitative data collected.  The paper ends with a discussion, conclusions 
and policy recommendations.     
2. Literature Review 
This literature review draws upon two overlapping streams of academic research 
pertinent to the empirical focus of the paper.  First, we explore the concept of regional 
resilience and how this manifests itself when areas are faced with unforeseen or 
“exogenous shocks”.   Second, it examines the literature on economic uncertainty and firm-
level behaviour and outcomes.  
2.2 Regional Resilience  
While the resilience metaphor has been deployed disparately across various 
disciplines it is commonly conceptualised as the capacity for an entity (such as a region 
or firm) to “resist, absorb, adjust to, and recover successfully from shocks or disturbances 
that disrupt that entity’s or system’s pre-shock state” (Martin and Gardiner, 2018, p. 
1802).  Resilience signifies an organisation’s ability to maintain reliable and effective 
functioning throughout disruption and adversity (Williams et al. 2017).  This in part has 
stemmed from the increased economic, environmental and political volatility which has 
constantly shaped and reshaped the world economy over the last twenty years, meaning 
that disequilibrium is very much the norm.  Recent exogenous shocks such as the onset 
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of the GFC, the unexpected Brexit vote and most recently the Covid-19 pandemic all 
testify to uncertainty becoming the “new normal” (Brown et al, 2020; Wenzel et al, 2020).  
Although originally invoked to depict resilience and in fields such as engineering and 
ecology (Healy and Bristow, 2020), in recent years there has been an upsurge of academic 
interest in the concept of “regional resilience” (Hassink, 2010; Boschma, 2015).  This 
concept is of critical importance because a key implication from this literature is that 
differences in resiliency to major shocks can contribute to determining the long‐run 
growth paths of different regions (Bristow and Healy, 2014).  Indeed, an expanding 
empirical literature has revealed how different locations have differing capabilities to 
deal with exogenous or unforeseen shocks.   
A common focus within the literature has been to examine how different locations 
cope with unexpected shocks such as major recessions and crisis events (Martin, 2018). 
A number of studies have also examined the impact on regional resilience generated by 
the shock of the GFC (Dijkstra et al, 2015; Giannakis and Bruggeman 2017).  An 
interesting recent study assessed credit scores to assess firm resilience during the post-
GFC period (Soroka et al, 2019).  This showed firm closure was often precipitated by 
falling credit scores in the years prior to foreclosure.  One Spanish study found that the 
regions least affected by the crash were those specialising in the most dynamic and 
productive industries (Cuadrado-Roura and Maroto, 2016).  In an empirical study of the 
UK it was found that regional resilience to the GFC was highest in areas where the stock 
of knowledge intensive service firms was greatest (Bishop, 2019).  Similarly, a Canadian 
study also found that regions with the greatest resilience were those dominated by 
business services, which act as “regional shock absorbers” (Ray et al, 2017).  Blažek et al 
(2020) found that major European financial centres such as Frankfurt, Paris and London 
were those demonstrating the greatest resilience to the GFC.     
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While this body of evidence shows how aggregate economic performance is 
affected by cyclical shocks, it fails to properly explain how different types of firms 
(specifically SMEs) adapt, change and reconfigure themselves to accommodate 
destabilising unforeseen shocks.  Indeed, while overall only a limited body of work has 
examined resilience in SMEs (Wishart, 2018), some studies have vividly illustrated that 
entrepreneurship is central to creating more resilient regional economies (Williams and 
Vorley, 2014).  Conversely, regional resilience can be undermined in peripheral 
economies with low levels of entrepreneurial ambition and dynamism (Gherhes et al, 
2018).   This latter point is crucially important and shows the path-dependent nature of 
resilience within some entrepreneurial ecosystems (Roundy et al, 2017).    
Consequently, there is now growing awareness of the importance of better 
understanding firm “agency” to adapt to shocks as a means of better appraising the 
resilience of the regions in which they are based (Bristow and Healy, 2014).   In other 
words, not all firms are equally resilient when faced by destabilising shocks.  Therefore, 
there seems “good reason” to argue that a fuller conceptualisation of regional resilience 
must incorporate “an understanding of the resilience of individual firms and their specific 
capacities to cope with, adapt to and reconfigure their technological, network and 
organizational structures within a constantly evolving economic environment” (Soroka et 
al, 2019, p. 3).   Given their crucial importance to modern day economies, SMEs may be a 
suitable “unit of analysis” and a powerful barometer for measuring regional resilience. 
 
2.2 Uncertainty and Firm Behaviour 
We now turn attention to a related micro-level literature to see how different 
types of SMEs may cope with profound uncertainty caused by events such as Brexit.  
Research from a wide range of disciplines including economics, entrepreneurship and 
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strategic management have all examined the fundamental role of uncertainty in affecting 
firm-level decision-making processes (Milliken, 1987; Baker et al, 2016; Bylund and 
McCaffrey, 2017; Wenzel et al, 2020). Almost a century ago, the US economist Frank 
Knight (1921) first examined the crucial role of uncertainty in shaping economic behavior 
by making the important distinction between risk and uncertainty. For Knight the 
essential fact is that risk can be measured, but true uncertainty (or Knightian uncertainty) 
is not readily quantifiable.  Rare, so-called “black swan events” (Orlik and Veldkamp, 
2014), such as Brexit, the GFC or the Covid-19 pandemic generate such acute uncertainty 
they have consequences so far-reaching they represent something of an “unknowable 
risk” for firms (Diebold et al, 2010).   
According to North (1990), institutions exist due to the uncertainties involved in 
human interaction and the institutional environment determines the formal and informal 
rules of the game. As such a stable institutional environment is crucial for mediating 
entrepreneurial activity and firm-level strategic behaviour (Rodrik, 1991; Minniti, 2008).  
Conversely, prior evidence suggests that unforeseen events can hinder the effective 
operation of institutions (such as banks during the global financial crisis) generating 
acute levels of uncertainty, which in turn leads to reductions (and delays) in tangible and 
intangible investments (Julio and Yook, 2012; Doshi et el, 2018).  
Extant prior evidence suggests that SMEs may be disproportionately impacted by 
uncertainty given their lower resiliency to unexpected shocks (Ghosal and Loungani 
2000; Ghosal and Ye, 2015; Lee et al, 2015; Doshi et al, 2018; Brown et al, 2020).  Most 
SMEs are often controlled by resource-constrained entrepreneurs and managers with 
limited contingency planning or foresight capabilities, making it difficult for such firms to 
deal with heightened levels of uncertainty (Brown et al, 1998).  By contrast, some studies 
attest to the fact some astute SMEs can overcome adversity through their business 
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acumen and firm-level innovation (Bamiatzi and Kirchmaier, 2014; Morgan et al, 2020).  
Of course, it should be borne in mind that not all SMEs have the same levels of resources 
and innovative competences.  Very small so-called micro-sized SMEs employing less than 
10 people are considerably different to larger medium-sized enterprises. This may 
manifest itself in more limited risk mitigation capabilities. Heightened uncertainty can 
also inhibit SMEs investing for the future, thereby preventing firms undertaking riskier 
growth-related activities such as innovation (Lee et al, 2015).   
Overall, therefore the impact of uncertainty when faced with exogenous shocks is 
likely to vary significantly across different types of SMEs according to their size, strategic 
orientation and sectoral orientation.  As a consequence, an investigation of the types of 
SMEs likely to be affected by Brexit, and how this is likely to affect future strategic 
intentions and decisions is a highly relevant exercise from both a conceptual focus on 
regional resilience and from a policy perspective. 
 
3. Methodology  
In response to calls for more multi-level approaches towards studying regional 
resilience (Korber and McNaughton, 2017), this research adopted a mixed methods 
approach involving both quantitative survey analysis and qualitative interviews with 
SMEs.  This approach is recognized to be of significant value, particularly when research 
needs to be contextualized in wider phenomena (Molina-Azorín et al., 2012) or when 
there are interaction effects at play (Creswell, 2014). Given longitudinal approaches are 
often need to monitor resilience over time (Bristow and Healy, 2020),  this method 
enabled the collection of ‘baseline’ views on perceptions on the impact of Brexit via the 
survey and further exploration and triangulation of these views and emerging impacts 
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two years later via interviews.2  This complementarity is a key strength of mixed methods 
work (Molina-Azorín et al., 2012). 
In terms of the survey, we utilised the Longitudinal Small Business Survey (LSBS) 
compiled by the UK Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS).  The 
LSBS is one of the largest annual attitudinal surveys of SMEs undertaken in the UK, 
sampling approximately 10,000 firms. In the immediate aftermath of the referendum 
result in June 2016, a number of specific questions were added to the LSBS in order to 
gauge the nature and potential economic impact of Brexit on SMEs. This included specific 
questions such as whether entrepreneurs and/or small business managers perceived the 
UK’s exit from the EU as a major obstacle to the success of your business in general.   
The data presented in this paper are from the 2017 survey (Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills 2018) – the most recent year for which the complete LSBS data were 
available. While the data is over two years old, the results provide insights into the 
performance and challenges of Scotland’s SMEs since the Brexit vote.  For the purposes 
of the present analysis, the larger UK-wide dataset mentioned above was further refined 
to the Scottish-based SMEs surveyed during 2017.  In 2017, 1042 Scottish SMEs took part 
in the survey, of which 739 had employees.  The LSBS data is weighted to ensure that the 
results are representative of the overall Scottish SME population.  A series of statistical 
tests (informed by previous research on Brexit and uncertainty) were carried out on 
these largely categorical data in order to discover possible relationships between Brexit-
related competitive issues and various firm-level metrics. 
In terms of interviews, the researchers undertook 21 interviews with a wide and 
diverse cohort of Scottish SMEs (see Table 1 below).  Qualitative interviews are 
 
2 Note that survey respondents and interviewees were discrete groups, so it was not possible to trace the 
development of individuals’ views. We thus report on sentiments from wider populations. 
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particularly appropriate during times of intense economic and social change (e.g. 
Schoenberger, 1991), where complex issues require nuanced probing.  The firms 
interviewed were randomly selected from a list of Scottish SMEs obtained from the 
commercial business database Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME). The inclusion 
criteria were that participants had to be employers with 1 to 249 employees, registered 
in Scotland and actively trading in Scotland.  In total, 189 firms were approached with 21 
agreeing to be interviewed, giving a response rate of 11%. These firms operated in a very 
diverse range of different sectors and geographic locations, and were of various sizes, 
ages and varied ownership structures (see Table 1 below). 
[Insert Table 1 here]    
Interviews were conducted Spring to Autumn 2019, when political uncertainty about 
the Brexit process was at its peak due to the fraught nature of the negotiation process.  
The interviews were conducted with owner-managers and entrepreneurs; these typically 
lasted between 30 and 60 minutes.  They were semi-structured to explore commonalities 
and differences (Patton, 1990) and primarily focused on Brexit-related concerns, the type 
of impacts detected and the role of policy support for SMEs.  The thematic issues explored 
in the semi-structured interviews probed to see the types of firms most affected, the key 
concerns expressed by the interviewees and the operational impact on the SMEs 
examined. A significant amount of the interviews were used to probe their reactions to 
the increased uncertainty within their operations together with the nature of the 
adjustment strategies and organizational changes deployed by the SMEs to mitigate the 
changing environment.    All interviews were recorded and transcribed immediately upon 
completion.  The data was analysed based on an a priori coding framework developed 
from the regional resilience and uncertainty literatures, although a number of themes and 
codes emerged from the data analysis process (i.e. types of firms most affected). Each 
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transcript was analysed independently by the researchers, before codes were compared 
and reassessed by the researchers in order to ensure analytical rigour (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). While direct quotations are used to ensure transparency of collected 
data (Healy and Perry, 2000) and to allow the data to “let the data speak” for itself 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2006, p. 119), companies have been anonymised and any 
identifying information withheld.  The direct quotes in the paper are taken from a wide 
variety of the cohort interviewed.  
 
4. Quantitative Analysis  
This section examines Scottish SMEs as a whole, utilizing the LSBS data descrived 
earlier. As a starting point, it was critical to ascertain how these SMEs viewed Brexit 
overall.  To Scottish-based SMEs, the UK’s departure from the EU ranks only sixth in terms 
of competitive challenges, well behind other, commonly-cited barriers such as market 
competition, taxation, and other issues.  We can see from Figure 1, that Brexit was viewed 
as  competitive threat by slightly more Scottish SMEs than their counterparts in the rest 
of the UK.  This may in part owe to the fact that voting patterns strongly diverged between 
Scotland and the rest of the UK during the Brexit referendum, with the former country 
much more strongly predisposed towards remaining in the EU (McHarg and Mitchell, 
2017).3  For the most part, Brexit was seen as a one of many key competitive issues 
confronting SMEs. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
With this in mind, a majority of the ensuing analyses encompass the nearly 30 
percent of Scottish SMEs (311 firms) that cited Brexit as a competitive issue.  For this 
 
3 During the referendum Scotland voted by a majority of 62% to 38% in favour of remaining within the 
EU. 
 
13 
 
group of Scottish SMEs (and for a particular subset of these firms, to be detailed below), 
Brexit was a very salient concern.  Figure 2 suggests that exporters viewed Brexit 
differently relative to non-exporters in terms of whether it posed a challenge to their firm, 
by a statistically significant margin of 50.3 to 25.4 percent, respectively (chi-square, p < 
0.01).  Again, this dovetails with the opaqueness about the future, and with a strong 
reluctance to engage internationally due to uncertainty about the international trade 
environment. International markets (especially new, untested markets) inevitably 
provide some degree of uncertainty, particularly when set against domestic customers. 
Indeed, the Brexit scenario and its incumbent uncertainty seems to pose a relevant threat 
to exporters. For these SMEs, the very possibility of increased barriers to EU markets 
increases the amount of perceived administrative or psychic distance between buyer and 
seller4.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
The theme of uncertainty surrounding Brexit follows in Figure 3, which provides 
a breakdown of three types of innovation (a new product, service, or process developed 
within the past three years) and whether these groups of firms viewed Brexit as an 
obstacle to their firm-level operations.  In each case, there were significant differences 
between innovators and non-innovators.  In terms of product innovation, the difference 
was 38.0 to 27.8 percent (chi-square, p < 0.01).  With regard to service-oriented 
innovation, the difference was 35.1 to 27.5 percent (chi-square, p = 0.012).  Finally, in 
terms of process innovation, the results were again significant by a margin of 38.1 to 27.8 
percent (chi-square, p < 0.01). As with the case of the exporters, the data suggests Brexit 
was perceived as a significant competitive challenge for a particular subset of Scottish 
 
4 Psychic distance denotes factors preventing flows of information between firms and markets, such as 
languages and cultural issues, that incur learning costs (Child et al 2009). 
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SMEs, most notably innovative firms. Importantly, these are often the types of ambitious 
and outward-looking firms that policymakers actively attempt to grow and nurture 
(Mason and Brown, 2013). 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
As seen above, Brexit impacts (or is perceived to impact) a certain type of firm.  
We now probe “why” Brexit is perceived as a competitive concern.  As shown in Figure 4, 
the top two Brexit-related concerns focus on uncertainty.  Uncertainty is often cited as a 
reason firms are reluctant to explore new markets or engage in risk-taking business in 
general, especially for SMEs with limited resources (Bylund and McCaffrey, 2017). The 
Brexit referendum has undoubtedly introduced a large degree of uncertainty to firm-level 
plans and operations. The combination of uncertainty about a new regulatory 
environment, coupled with market uncertainty (i.e. will firms need to find new export 
destinations) provides considerable barriers for Scottish SMEs moving forward, 
potentially impacting strategic decisions and innovation.  The possibility of increased 
import costs caused by new tarrifs were also viewed as a concern by nearly 60% of 
Scottish SMEs.  
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
The remaining Brexit-related competitive issues concern the movements of goods, 
services, capital, or labour leading up to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. But again, even 
these obstacles encompass some degree of uncertainty.  For example, potentially higher 
input costs provides yet another obstacle for firms operating in cost-competitive 
environments. Additionally, a potential decrease in investment could have detrimental 
effects on SMEs, especially in terms of their future competitiveness in the marketplace.  
And while the labour-related issues (both unskilled and skilled) were selected by 
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comparatively few of the surveyed firms, it remains a salient issue, especially if firms are 
to remain competitive in comparatively tight labour markets. 
Whilst uncertainty generates concerns about current activities it equally mediates 
future-oriented plans.  The data notes that comparatively few Scottish SMEs see positive 
effects from the UK exiting the EU – a combined 5.5 percent of firms see any positive 
impacts from the referendum.  By contrast, a full third of SMEs foresaw some sort of 
negative impact stemming from the UK’s departure from the EU viewing it as either very 
(or fairly) detrimental.  Just under half of the surveyed SMEs were neutral with regard to 
Brexit.  In essence, a third of the surveyed Scottish SMEs either viewed Brexit very 
negatively whilst a very small minority viewed it favourably.   
 Table 2 provides a look at the ways in which Scottish SMEs perceived their plans to 
be impacted by Brexit. Note that a rather small percentage of all surveyed Scottish SMEs 
(typically less than 10%, see Table 2) were impacted in terms of their plans for exports, 
innovative practices and capital investment and so on.  However, these proportions 
change markedly when one examines the group of Scottish SMEs that originally indicated 
that Brexit was a critical obstacle that could impact their operations. All of the plans were 
selected by a comparatively large percentage of firms in this subgroup.  For a start, fully 
80% of these firms estimated that their export expansion plans were influenced by Brexit.  
Once more, this ties into the role that uncertainty is playing in firm decision making.  
Within the Scottish context, this lends further support to earlier concerns over Scottish 
SMEs finding new (i.e. outside the EU) export markets post-Brexit (see Kalafsky and 
Brown, 2018).  Firms appear to be holding back on export plans until they ascertain what 
the future trading landscape will entail.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
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The next two plans that were mentioned by these SMEs concerned innovation in 
terms of products, services, or new processes. Again, the uncertainty surrounding the 
UK’s departure has caused this group of Scottish firms to hold back on their innovative 
plans. Importantly, Brexit also appears to have potentially negative effects on plans for 
capital investment and workforce training. Essentially, SMEs might refrain from longer-
term investment strategies if there is a large degree of opaqueness about the trade and 
overall economic environment moving forward. 
When taken together, the findings within this section lend strong support to previous 
literature (e.g. Ghosal and Ye 2015) concerning the negative impacts of uncertainty on 
SME operations and performance. More specifically, the survey data intimates that 
innovative and export-oriented Scottish SMEs see Brexit as a major impediment to their 
business plans, corroborating previous evidence (Brown et al, 2019).  These analyses in 
turn provide a context for the next section, which presents results from firm-level 
interviews providing an in-depth look at the micro-foundations of this endemic 
uncertainty. 
 
5. Qualitative Findings 
The interviews with the 21 SMEs were undertaken to augment, probe and triangulate 
the aggregate survey analysis outlined above.   In this regard the interviews uncovered a 
number of important aspects concerning the types of firms most affected, key Brexit-
related concerns, the type of impacts detected and the role of policy support for SMEs.   
 
5.1 Types of Firms Most Affected 
In line with the survey analysis, our interviews strongly suggest certain types of 
companies are more acutely and deleteriously affected by Brexit than others.  Of the  
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interviewed SMEs, roughly two-thirds were domestically oriented firms with little or no 
export or internationalisation activities.  These firms are engaged in a wide variety of 
different service and manufacturing activities such as printing, food and drink 
production, logistics, training and events management.  Overall, this cohort of SMEs were 
quite stable in terms of their growth, employment levels and export-intensity.  In the 
main, this group of firms were relatively unconcerned with the potential impact of Brexit.  
While some did detect some potential pitfalls such as regulatory change and the 
devaluation of the pound, these were deemed as relatively insignificant: “at the moment, 
it is business as normal”.  Another common trait across these organisations was a lack of 
any pre-planning to respond to Brexit or to enhance their resilience to the shock of Brexit.  
This relative insulation from the entire Brexit process was reflected by a number of 
participants, as per the following statements: 
“We have not seen any impacts on our organisation.”    
 
“I don’t think we thought it [i.e. the referendum] would affect our growth at the 
stage.  And in fact, it has not affected our growth at all.” 
 
“We have not been adversely or positively affected by Brexit – but we’re just a bit 
bored with it.” 
 
“The organisation has not done anything to prepare in any department.” 
 
 This relatively sanguine view of Brexit did not occur in the remaining third of 
SMEs interviewed.  In the main these were growth, innovation- and export-oriented 
SMEs.  These firms were typically found in more high-tech oriented industries such as 
aquaculture, technical textiles, pharmaceuticals, biotech and chemicals.  Many of these 
firms were highly innovative undertaking ongoing R&D and other growth-oriented 
activities.  On the whole, this cohort of firms undertook some exporting activity but many 
were predominantly UK-focused.  From the outset of the Brexit process many of these 
 
18 
 
firms were deeply concerned by its potential impact.  During the turbulence caused many 
of these firms had been negatively affected by the Brexit shock, primarily due to 
uncertainty which is “the last thing you want as a business”.  Most had encountered 
reductions in their growth and decreased levels of employment5.  As a result, many of 
these firms had adapted and put in place strategies to accommodate the effects emanating 
from Brexit, often dedicating considerable amounts of management time to this task.   
These effects are intimated by the following statements by the interviewees: 
 
 “Brexit has slowed us down, having to deal with more [internal] bureaucracy” 
 
“The uncertainty is making it difficult to expand and grow in Europe, while at the 
same time, the company is also hesitant to compete in North America” 
 
“Basically, we have all the steps in place, so really until a final decision and path is 
decided on, we’re at a point where there’s nothing more we can do until we know 
more” 
 
“We had plans, but they did not incorporate the situation whereby a government 
could not come to any solution.  While they were extending the uncertainty, our 
customers took that time to source elsewhere” 
 
 Therefore, while acute uncertainty is confronting firms from all sectoral 
backgrounds, it appears that those who are disproportionately negatively affected were 
often innovative and export-oriented SMEs.  This corroborates our aggregate survey 
findings reported above.  These firms were typically found in more high-tech oriented 
industries such as aquaculture, technical textiles, pharmaceuticals, biotech and chemicals 
who often rely more of wider external supply chains and non-domestic markets.   
 
5.2 Key Concerns  
 
5 In one instance, a very export-oriented SME encountered a significant reduction in its employment from 
90 to 65.   
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In terms of concerns expressed by the SMEs in relation to Brexit, the main issues 
identified across the entire population of firms related to the problem of uncertainty, 
especially in relation to the future regulatory environment.  This remained the case for 
most SMEs irrespective of size, age, sector and level of export-orientation.  Given the 
interviews were conducted almost three years after the Brexit referendum, many firms 
were deeply concerned about the lack of clarity about the future trade and regulatory 
environment.  In many cases this had negatively affected the SMEs to varying degrees, 
especially the longer the negotiations between the UK and the EU had gone on.  The 
nature and opaqueness caused by pervasive uncertainty is reflected in the following 
statements:  
“Concerned – but concerned because you actually don’t know.  We didn’t know what 
to be concerned about yet.” 
 
 “The indecisive nature of it and the fact that it is still unclear whether it will happen.  
I’m not certain it will even happen.” 
 
“Fundamentally, nothing has changed.  And since nothing has changed legally, the 
only thing that has changed is our customers thought they couldn’t get products from 
us, so they sourced elsewhere.” 
 
“I suspect we will do less business in the EU than we planned to do.  We will probably 
not seek out European business unless it comes to us.  We’ll look for internal business 
or possibly tackle the US instead of Europe. Europe is no longer the easy option.” 
 
For the most part, this resulted in a lack of action rather than proactive measures 
to adapt or accommodate changes to the future environment6.   Again, this applied equally 
across all types of SMEs who in the main lacked the type of strategic capacity to enact 
strategies to mitigate any harmful effects.  In the main there was a feeling that all that 
could be done was to “wait and see” and then react.  In very small micro-businesses this 
lack of planning or preparedness was primarily due to a lack of management time.  One 
 
6 For some rare exceptions see section 5.4  
 
20 
 
individual stressed: “I simply don’t have the time, so many question marks remain”.   
However, this was even the case for the SMEs who had dedicated a considerable amount 
of managerial time to examining how the changes may affect the firms in the future.  The 
lack of action is revealed in the following remarks:      
“Until we know what the result is, I can’t make any plans.” 
 
“At this point, until we know about tariffs and free trade information, there is very 
little we can do.” 
 
“How am I supposed to know?  How is anyone supposed to know?  I don’t think 
anyone knows!  How am I to prepare for Brexit when I don’t know what I am 
preparing for?  I can’t.  It is unknown what is going to happen.  So how am I supposed 
to prepare for that?” 
 
 “Basically, we have all the steps in place, so really until a final decision and path is 
decided on, we’re at a point where there’s nothing more we can do until we know 
more.” 
 
5.3 Operational Impacts  
The research discovered a range of different Brexit-related effects and impacts 
within the SMEs interviewed that were primarily designed to negate the problems caused 
by chronic Brexit-induced uncertainty.  A number of the firms seemed to be focusing on 
cost reduction strategies to provide a buffer for any declines in sales caused by the 
uncertainty and turbulence.  This approach was described as “battening down the 
hatches” by one seasoned entrepreneur so that the firm could withstand the financial 
shock due to a decline in sales or the loss of key customers.  This was very common across 
the two-thirds who were less internationally exposed.  SMEs described themselves as:     
“wary of spending money at the moment, just in case we have to get through as short-
term blip, if that makes sense.”   
 
“reluctant to invest [into new computers], because I want to have the money 
available in the bank if it all goes wrong just after Brexit.” 
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For other more growth-oriented firms this also entailed actual reductions in 
capital expenditure.  One firm stated bluntly: “we [now] have problems with expansion”.  
Perhaps most worryingly from a longer-term competitive perspective, Brexit seemed to 
be weighing most heavily on the minds of the more export-oriented and innovative firms.  
This meant that these types of firms were actively scaling back their plans for growth-
oriented activities such as exporting and innovation expenditures.  In one SME, the money 
previously spent on R&D was allocated into a so-called “buffer fund” in case a collapse in 
orders arose.  These adverse effects seemed to be particularly affecting manufacturing 
product-based firms rather than service-based firms.  As a result of the Brexit process, 
one SME had to “dramatically restructure the business (including layoffs) in light of the 
sales reductions”.  Overall, the main negative effects from Brexit across growth oriented 
SMEs had been reduced capital expenditure, reduced innovation expenditure and a 
reduced EU export focus, as reflected by the following statements:   
“Yes – we have put on hold any product developments for the EU market, such as 
irrigation and pipe rehabilitation.” 
 
“[We were] looking to invest into a capital expenditure specifically designed for 
products in Europe, but those sales have stalled, so the expense has been put on hold.”     
   
“90% of the business is in the UK, but we are getting to the stage where there isn’t 
enough business in the UK not to expand overseas.  And now we don’t know whether 
to expand into Europe or not.” 
 
“In terms of exports, it has completely hampered our planned entry into other EU 
markets.” 
 
5.4 Adjustment Strategies 
While the above operational impacts had been quite a reactive response to Brexit, 
some SMEs had been more proactive via various adjustment strategies.  These strategies 
seemed to be firm specific and often pre-determined by the nature of their industry and 
sector they operated within.  In some cases, this was fairly minor in that firms had taken 
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on extra stock from suppliers from the EU.  The devaluation of the pound following the 
referendum had encouraged some firms to consider sourcing more suppliers from the UK 
rather than overseas.  Of greater strategic importance were the changes adopted by some 
companies which entailed SMEs seeking to break into new and different markets.  For 
example, a conference organising business had started to target the US market to help 
reduce their reliance on the EU as Brexit had made Scotland a “harder sell” to European 
customers.   
In some SMEs, there had been discernible changes as a result of the 
experimentation of the founders/entrepreneurs.  For example, in one fisheries business 
this had resulted in the change to their business model7.  Due to Brexit-related concerns, 
the business now enables customers to lease rather than buy their products to reduce the 
sunk costs entailed for their customers.  This arose due to uncertainty facing customers 
because of their dependence on the EU as the core marketplace for Scottish shellfish.  In 
another company, an adjustment strategy deployed by the entrepreneur led them to 
begin a side-line property-related business to insulate themselves from any further 
collapse of their core business.       
In a very small number of cases, some SMEs had undertaken quite major structural 
adjustments to help alleviate potential negative effects from Brexit. Despite being quite 
small companies with less than 50 employees, two of the firms had decided to undertake 
major organisational changes as a consequence of Brexit.  In one instance, a maritime 
training provider who had become “a lot more concerned as time has gone on” decided to 
seek out a joint venture (JV) with an Italian counterpart.  The company was seeking to 
tender for a major contract from an Italian ferry provider and they were concerned that 
 
7 A business model describes “an architecture for how a firm creates and delivers value to customers, 
encompassing the flows of costs, revenues, and profits” (Teece, 2018, p. 40). 
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a lack of certainty around their accreditation status may undermine their chances of 
success.  Therefore, the JV was seen as a means of mitigating any possible regulatory 
uncertainty caused by being outwith the EU.    
In another case, a small Scottish pharmaceutical company focused on the design 
and development of anti-infective disease treatments had opted to move their head office.  
According to their CEO “Brexit has had a major effect on us.  We moved our key office to 
Dublin, Ireland”.  This move was primarily done so that the firm could license their 
products under the jurisdiction of the EU pharmaceutical authorities.  While such a step 
seems very adept at adjusting to the changing regulatory circumstances, it has 
nevertheless “had direct costs, effort and transfer of responsibilities”.   So rather than being 
an expansive or growth-oriented move, this step taken was more linked to alleviating any 
turbulence caused by the UK withdrawal from the EU regulatory frameworks.  
 
 5.5 Policy Issues  
Linking back to the role of institutions and regional resilience, the final issue 
examined concerned the usefulness (or otherwise) of support received by the firms from 
various public and private institutions to help them overcome Brexit-induced uncertainty 
and upheaval.  Across the population of SMEs examined, the vast majority had not 
proactively sought out advice from external public sector actors or private 
intermediaries.  Most had relied on their own local non-specialist networks for advice (i.e. 
“so far, only our accountants”).  The explanation for this was a belief that the problem itself 
lay with politicians and that “lack of clarity from the government” was the key problem 
facing the firms.  In most instances, firms had “not gone looking for help”.   While some of 
the larger better resourced SMEs had sought advice from various public and private 
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sector intermediaries, the commonplace view was that the types of advice offered were 
“pretty poor” and provided little in the way of practicable assistance:   
  
“We are part of the [Fife] Chamber of Commerce, so we have discussed it with them.” 
 
 “We spoke to our bank and financial institute, not to the trade bodies or lawyers.” 
 
 “I know the Customs do have a help line just now. They refer you to certain Customs 
notices that aren’t always effectual. The one document is 300 pages long, so you get 
a bit lost in them. To have somebody to listen to your questions and answer them 
would be helpful.” 
 
“We are were happy with the advice, but until we know [the situation], there is very 
limited things we can do.” 
 
In a smaller minority of cases, several of the larger more strategically adept firms had 
sought out and received dedicated assistance.  One larger SME had engaged strategy 
consultants to examine their business model to better focus on opportunities from 
operating outside of the EU.  A small number of others had accessed public sector 
assistance packages customised to help SMEs deal with Brexit.  The main support 
accessed by the companies was the Brexit Support Grant funded by the Scottish 
Government, providing between £2,000-4000 to help SMEs in Scotland manage a wide 
range of Brexit impacts.  This type of assistance was generally viewed positively as it 
provided financial incentives for SMEs to help adjust their strategies in light of Brexit-
related uncertainty in ways they themselves felt most beneficial.  In a number of cases 
this had led to the SMEs exploring new markets to enter8.  However, this type of strategic 
support is often only accessed by existing Scottish Enterprise account managed 
businesses, so knowledge of this scheme tends to be restricted to those firms.  
 
 
8 An aquaculture firm was exploring a move into the Nova Scotia market in Canada.  
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6. Discussion and Conclusions  
This paper makes a novel contribution to the literature on regional resilience by 
empirically examining the impact of Brexit on Scottish SMEs.  While much of the regional 
resilience literature has traditionally focused on the macro-level nature of change to 
entire regional economies, this paper highlights important firm-level behavioural 
impacts and changes in light of shocks such as Brexit.   Given their crucial importance for 
the Scottish economy, SMEs therefore act as a powerful barometer and a strong proxy for 
measuring levels of regional resilience.  Like others we strongly view that studying firms 
is a crucial mechanism for understanding regions and the use of informant interviews in 
particular enables us to make important connections between firm-level resilience and 
resilience at a regional-level (Markusen, 1994).   
Another innovative aspect of this research was the mixed methods approach 
deployed.  This enabled the research to examine ex ante the types of firms and their 
concerns identified after the referendum and then compliment this with an in-depth 
assessment of how the prolonged Brexit process had actually affected SMEs over 
subsequent years. This mixed-method approach lends itself well to properly 
understanding complex and contextualized issues (Molina-Azorín et al., 2012) such as 
Brexit-induced uncertainty which endures over the longer-term.  Indeed, in some 
respects the Brexit referendum turned from an exogenous shock to a “slow-moving crisis” 
which has still not fully resolved itself from a regulatory perspective, despite the fact that 
the UK has now formally left the EU9.  Owing to this, there seems conceptual merit in 
 
9 Slow moving crisis are defined as “incremental changes to the reigning institutional tissue in 
organizations and practices can upset the political and social balance of power, creating tensions across 
generations, regional tenure, ethnicity, political affiliation, and geographic location” (Pendall quoted in 
Pike et al, 2010, p. 8). 
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viewing exogenous shocks such as Brexit as a “process” rather than purely as “events” 
(Williams et al, 2017).                     
The research also produced interesting empirical findings to augment our 
understanding about firm-level resilience.  The work clearly shows how protracted 
uncertainty strongly challenges and undermines the resilience in some SMEs.   Whilst two 
thirds of the companies interviewed did not perceive Brexit to be a central or strategic 
problem, it is clear from our findings that certain types of SMEs (i.e. innovators, exporters 
and growth-oriented) were disproportionately concerned by Brexit, echoing other 
empirical studies (Brown et al, 2019).  Our in-depth interviews strongly confirmed these 
same firms to be the most detrimentally affected in terms of job losses, reduced exports 
and lower innovation expenditure.  In this sense, then, this work adds to the growing 
bodies of research about uncertainty and innovative SMEs (Williams and Vorley, 2017; 
Doshi et al, 2018). These findings are also of crucial importance for policy makers, as 
innovation is thought to play a key role in sustaining regional resilience in the longer-
term (Evenhuis and Dawley, 2017).    
In terms of the firm-level “agency” explored during the interviews, while the minority 
of Scottish SMEs had managed to deploy adjustment mechanisms to mitigate these 
negative effects, many firms’ encountered major difficulties coping with this uncertain 
and turbulent environment.  In the main the default strategy was strategic inaction; such 
“wait and see” approaches being a commonplace strategic response to uncertainty 
(Clarke and Liesch, 2017). While understandable, this lack of action is likely to make it 
more difficult for Scottish SMEs to respond to the fast changing regulatory landscape in 
the longer-term.   
A number of SMEs adopted a focus on crude cost reduction strategies to mitigate 
against innate uncertainty.  However, much of this was purely aimed at cutting back 
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growth-enhancing activities like innovation, capital investment and R&D.  In contrast to 
other studies (Bamiatzi and Kirchmaier, 2014), even growth-oriented and innovative 
Scottish SMEs demonstrated limited resilience in face of adversity, resulting in jobs being 
lost, expansion plans cut back, reduced exports and less innovation.  Interestingly, only a 
very small minority enacted more radical and innovative structural adjustment strategies 
(e.g. JVs and headquarter relocation).  Clearly, further work involving larger samples is 
needed to corroborate or refute the veracity of these findings.   
Nevertheless, this research thus has clear and important policy implications.  First, 
given that job losses in smaller companies tend be more enduring than from larger 
enterprises (Nyström, 2018), policymakers will have to make a concerted effort to help 
alleviate redundancies made by SMEs.  This may require a proactive approach given few 
of the SMEs examined sought advice and support or engaged with relevant institutions.  
Second, it appears from our analysis that the types of assistance most beneficial to bolster 
resilience in SMEs are dedicated bespoke financial support packages, such as the Scottish 
Government’s Brexit Support Grant, enabling SMEs to devise their assistance 
accordingly10.  To foster a culture of entrepreneurial adjustment in Scottish SMEs, there 
seems merit in expanding this programme to a wider range of potential beneficiaries, 
especially those most affected such as innovative and export-oriented SMEs.  This type of 
proactive policy framework may be particularly relevant in peripheral regions and 
weaker entrepreneurial ecosystems lacking a strong entrepreneurial culture such as 
Scotland (Roundy et al, 2017; Gherhes et al, 2018).   
Brexit has undoubtedly affected certain regions more than others and the impact of 
the Covid-19 crisis is likely to futher magnify these marked spatial imbalances across the 
 
10 For further information: https://www.prepareforbrexit.scot/updates/brexit-support-grant 
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UK in the future (Harris et al, 2020).  Echoing others (Billing et al, 2019; Brown et al, 
2019), to adequately deal with these potent complex forces generating profound 
uncertainty, greater devolved responsibility across all UK regions and devolved 
administrations in policy areas such as immigration and industrial policy will arguably 
be needed in order to increase firm-level regional resilience in the longer-term.          
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